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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen presenterer resultatene fra en analyse av fordelingene av varigheten som 
sosialhjelpmottaker I Luxembourg, Nederland, Norge og Sverige. 
1 Introduction
Most OECD countries operate extensive minimum-income beneﬁt systems designed to guarantee
an adequate standard of living to households and individuals with insuﬃcient means from other
sources. Means-tested ‘social assistance’ or ‘welfare’ beneﬁts target unemployed individuals
who lack the necessary employment and contribution record to be entitled to insurance-based
unemployment beneﬁts and those who have exhausted their rights to such beneﬁts.1 In many
countries, social assistance can moreover provide a top-up to earnings for low-income workers and
their families. The support provided through social assistance is typically intended – implicitly
or even explicitly – to be temporary covering employable individuals during periods of economic
hardship. Beneﬁts can however in principle be received for an unlimited time period as long as
the recipient continues to pass the means-test and satisfy other eligibility criteria.2
Rising caseload numbers in the 1980s and early 1990s (as documented for instance by Gough,
Bradshaw, Ditch, Eardley & Whiteford (1997)) and the resulting burden to public ﬁnances led
to growing concerns about long-term social assistance receipt. Under the impression – be it
right or wrong – that a signiﬁcant share of recipients rely on beneﬁts for prolonged time periods,
public and academic debates evolved around the question whether beneﬁt receipt might have
‘scarring eﬀects’, creating its own dependence and thus leading to ‘welfare traps’ (Plant, 1984).
Such debates and the ﬁnancial pressure from rising welfare reliance resulted in major welfare
reforms in a number of OECD countries – notably in the United States, the United Kingdom and
Germany. These reforms emphasised an ‘activating’ approach to beneﬁt provision by tightening
eligibility criteria, strengthening conditionality, and increasing support to employable recipients.3
In the academic work on social assistance receipt, there has been a long interest in studying
the drivers of beneﬁt receipt and in particular the incidence of long-term dependence (see for
instance Bane & Ellwood (1983) for an early contribution). The literature aims to contribute
to a better understanding of the incentive structures inherent to beneﬁt systems and to an
improved targeting of policies at those who are likely to beneﬁt the most. Measures to support
or ‘activate’ unemployed beneﬁt recipients – such as job-search assistance, counselling or work
experience programmes – should be well-targeted and tend to work best when implemented early-
on in a beneﬁt spell (Martin, 2000). Policy design therefore requires evidence on who receives
beneﬁts, what recipient groups are likely to remain on beneﬁts for longest, and what the chances
are of remaining self-suﬃcient for those who manage to leave beneﬁts. Yet, remarkably little
evidence exists to date on these ‘micro-dynamics’ of beneﬁt receipt, especially in Europe.
The principal obstacle for such work to date has been the lack of high-quality micro-level
panel data with short observation intervals. Survey-based panel data sets often provide reliable
information on beneﬁt receipt and household composition at the annual level only.4 Adminis-
trative records, which could provide higher-frequency observations (and which often also come
with larger sample sizes, lower attrition rates, and a higher data quality) are seldom available
1
2An exception is the U.S. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) that generally comes with a
60-month lifetime limit (for a discussion see Grogger (2003, 2004) and Grogger & Michalopoulos (2003)).
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For a recent overview of the institutional features of social assistance systems in OECD countries see Immervoll
(2010).
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An exception is the U.S. Survey of Income and Programme Participation (SIPP) that is based on four-monthly
interviews but whose panels only run for a maximum of four years.
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for research purposes. Much of the existing research on spell lengths and the frequency of long-
term beneﬁt receipt is therefore based on annual data. An obvious limitation of such studies is
that they do not distinguish between single long spells and a series of recurrent shorter spells.
Where data at monthly or quarterly intervals are available, observation periods tend to be short,
making an analysis of re-entry into beneﬁts of beneﬁt leavers (sometimes unfortunately referred
to as ‘recidivism’) diﬃcult.
In this paper, I describe the patterns of social assistance beneﬁt receipt in four European
countries – Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden – based on long panels of
monthly administrative data. The paper adds to the literature on social assistance dynam-
ics by providing comparable evidence on the length of beneﬁt spells in these countries. For
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden, this is ﬁrst such analysis at the national level that
I am aware of. For Norway, the paper updates and extends an earlier analysis for the 1990s by
Dahl & Lorentzen (2003a). A main contribution of the paper lies moreover in that it exploits
the long observation periods of the data sets by studying the frequency of repeat beneﬁt receipt,
an issue on which there currently exists little evidence.
The ﬁrst part of my analysis provides an overview of social assistance beneﬁt receipt rates
in the four countries. There has been no uniform trend in beneﬁt receipt over the last decade
or so, with receipt rates having declined in the Netherlands and Norway, having remained
stable in Sweden, and having risen in Luxembourg. In the late 2000s, beneﬁt receipt rates
for the working-age population varied between 2% in Norway and 4% in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. Comparing receipt rates and transition rates for monthly and annualized data,
I ﬁnd that, unsurprisingly, annualized rates of beneﬁt receipt substantially overestimate the
frequency of beneﬁt receipt in any single month of the year. The magnitude of this eﬀect
depends on the degree of turnover in beneﬁt receipt and is much higher in Norway and Sweden
than in Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
In the second part of the paper, I present evidence on the paths that individuals take into
and out of social assistance for the period from January 2001 to December 2008. There is
substantial heterogeneity in beneﬁt spell lengths, both within and across countries. In the two
Nordic countries, short-term beneﬁt receipt is the norm with median spell lengths of only two
months, and with only 6% and 11% of spells in Norway and Sweden lasting longer than one year.
In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, long-term beneﬁt receipt is frequent: Median spell lengths
are 14 and nine months, respectively, and 35% and 24% of all beneﬁt spells last 24 months or
longer. Beneﬁt leavers are however much more likely to return into beneﬁts in Norway and
Sweden, and time until re-entry into beneﬁts for beneﬁt leavers moreover is typically very short.
The total duration of beneﬁt receipt per recipient across spells however remains shorter in the
two Nordic countries with a median ‘net duration’ of 7 and 10 months in Norway and Sweden,
respectively, compared to 23 and 33 months in the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the
existing work on individual-level patterns of social assistance receipt. Sections 3 and 4 give a
brief overview of the institutional framework in the four countries and present the data sources
used in the analysis. In Section 5, I describe the aggregate dynamics of beneﬁt receipt, be-
fore presenting in Section 6 results from my analysis of the micro-dynamics of beneﬁt receipt.
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Section 7 concludes.
2 Relevant literature
The earliest available evidence on the duration of social assistance beneﬁt receipt is based on an-
nual household survey data on the receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)5
in the United States. Bane & Ellwood (1983) and O’Neill, Bassi & Wolf (1987) study the re-
ceipt of AFDC in the late 1960s and 1970s using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, respectively. Hoynes & MaC-
urdy (1994) document developments in the distribution of spell lengths over a 20-year period
until 1989 again based on PSID data and relate them to changes in recipient characteristics and
in the economic environment. In a seminal study, Bane & Ellwood (1994) use again PSID data
for the late 1960s to 1980s to study AFDC spell lengths and the return to beneﬁts of welfare
leavers. They raise the important methodological point that when measuring spell lengths, it is
crucial to distinguish between results obtained from a sample of individuals receiving beneﬁts
at a certain point in time and those beginning a spell in that period. This ﬁnding is discussed
in more detail further below. One common conclusion of these studies is that while there is
clear evidence of long-term beneﬁt receipt, the large majority of spells are relatively short. An
obvious limitation of studies based on annual data is however that the measurement of spell
lengths is quite imprecise. For individuals who remain on beneﬁts for prolonged periods, beneﬁt
spell lengths will be overestimated as no distinction can be made between single long spells and
a series of recurrent shorter spells.
Later studies of U.S. welfare beneﬁt dynamics that use information at the monthly level are
typically also based on survey data. A series of articles use data from the Survey of Income
and Programme Participation (SIPP): Fitzgerald (1991, 1995) studies AFDC spell lengths over
a period of 32 months, Harris (1993) examines to what extent single mothers combine receipt of
AFDC with work, and Blank & Ruggles (1994) and Harris (1996) look at re-entries to AFDC
beneﬁt receipt among welfare leavers over periods of up to three and up to six years, respectively.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the years 1979 to 1989,
Pavetti (1993) compares AFDC spell lengths obtained from monthly and annualized data. She
ﬁnds that spell lengths are indeed overestimated in the annualized data, though the magnitude
of this eﬀect is relatively modest.6
One concern about these studies is that survey-based data on beneﬁt receipt may not be
very reliable. Even though interviews in the SIPP are conducted at four-monthly intervals and
thus relatively frequently, Blank & Ruggles (1994) report a ‘seam bias problem’ observing a
disproportionately large number of beneﬁt transitions where interview periods start and end.
Similarly, Pavetti (1993) observes that in the NLSY, 22% of all welfare spells last exactly from
January to December, and that December endings account of 47% of all spell endings. This
casts doubts on the reliability of these results.
5AFDC was the precursor of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which was introduced in 1996.
6Based on monthly data, Pavetti estimates that 70% of all starting spells last two years or less and that only
7% of spells last eight years or longer. When annualizing these data, she ﬁnds that the share of spells lasting no
longer than two years drops to 47% while the proportion of spells with a length of eight years or above rises to
12%.
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A rare example of an early study of welfare beneﬁt dynamics based on monthly data from
administrative sources comes from Blank (1989), who, using six years of data from Denver
and Seattle for the early 1970s, ﬁnds weak evidence for duration dependence in AFDC receipt.
Hoynes (2000) presents evidence on receipt of AFDC in California based on administrative
data for the period from 1987 to 1992. The spell lengths she ﬁnds are relatively similar to
those calculated in previous studies that use survey data, with 28% of spells lasting at most six
months and 38% lasting over two years. Among beneﬁt leavers, 41% re-enter within two years
of leaving.
From the late 1990s, increased availability of data from administrative records for research
purposes primarily outside the U.S. has allowed researchers to produce what are arguably more
reliable results on the length of beneﬁt spells. For Canada, Barrett & Cragg (1998) study welfare
use in the province of British Columbia using administrative data for the 1980s and early 1990s.
They ﬁnd beneﬁt duration to be typically short, with 75% of spells ending within six months.
Repeat beneﬁt receipt however is frequent, with 25% of beneﬁt leavers returning within three
months and half of all beneﬁt leavers returning within a year. Wilson (1999) uses administrative
data from New Zealand to study beneﬁt receipt for a cohort of welfare receivers from 1993 over
a period of ﬁve years. While only 5% of beneﬁt recipients remained on beneﬁts for the entire
period, more than one-third were still receiving beneﬁts at the end of the observation period. A
challenge therefore appears to be not so much to quickly move recipients oﬀ beneﬁts, but rather
to ensure that they remain self-suﬃcient after having left.
A series of articles based on fortnightly administrative data from the Australian Longitud-
inal Data Set (LDS) illustrate again the high frequency of repeated spells and emphasise the
importance of considering transfers across diﬀerent income-support programmes. For the 1995
inﬂow sample of recipients of means-tested single parent beneﬁts, Gregory & Klug (2003) show
that spell lengths tend to be short with 45% of all spells lasting shorter than one year. How-
ever, nearly half of all recipients had spells of other types of income-support beneﬁts during the
51/2-year observation period (though this includes receipt of Newstart Allowance, Australia’s
unemployment beneﬁt). Tseng & Wilkins (2003) show that up to one-third of the Australian
working-age population touches on at least one of various income-support beneﬁts in a given
year; one-sixth of all recipients continuously receive support over the same 51/2-year period.
Tseng, Vu & Wilkins (2008) ﬁnd that ‘churning’ is a typical feature of income-support receipt,
with over half of all recipients leaving and re-entering beneﬁts at least once over a ﬁve-year
period. Repeated cycling into and out of beneﬁts by contrast is not the norm, and less than
one-quarter of ‘churners’ have four or more spells. Transfers between diﬀerent programme types
during a single beneﬁt spell do not occur very often.
Relatively little evidence exists to date on beneﬁt spell lengths in Europe. A series of
studies look at beneﬁt receipt duration at the city level using monthly data for the German
city of Bremen (Buhr & Weber, 1998; Leisering & Leibfried, 1999), Bremen and Gothenburg
(Gustafsson & Voges, 1998), and a set of eight diﬀerent European cities (Gustafsson, Mu¨ller,
Negri & Voges, 2002). The ﬁrst three studies conclude that social assistance receipt is mostly a
temporary phenomenon, whereas Gustafsson et al. ﬁnd large diﬀerences in beneﬁt spell lengths
across cities as discussed further below. With observation periods of ﬁve years or less, the authors
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are however limited in their ability to account for repeat spells in beneﬁt receipt. In a recent
study on beneﬁt receipt in the Dutch city of Rotterdam, Snel, Reelick & Groenenboom (2013)
challenge Leisering & Leibfried’s conclusion (drawn for a diﬀerent city) that episodes of social
assistance receipt are typically short. Based on seven years of administrative data starting in
1999, they calculate that nearly two-thirds of beneﬁt spells last longer than a year. One in four
recipients has a total (or ‘net’) beneﬁt duration of ﬁve years or more over the seven-year period.
Repeat spells by contrast are found to be the exception, with four out of ﬁve beneﬁt recipients
in 1999 having had only one single spell. Dahl & Lorentzen (2003a) look at the duration of
beneﬁt receipt in Norway for the 1995 cohort of social assistance recipients over an eight-year
period from 1992 to 1999. Using the same source of administrative data for Norway as I do,
they illustrate the point raised by Bane & Ellwood (1994) that sample selection (above all the
distinction between samples of starting vs. on-going spells) and spell censoring have a strong
inﬂuence on measured spell lengths.
This paper contributes to the summarized literature on social assistance spell lengths by
presenting comparable evidence for four European countries. The results for the Netherlands
and Sweden complement existing studies at the city level by Snel et al. (2013) for Rotterdam
and by Gustafsson & Voges (1998) and Gustafsson et al. (2002) for Gothenberg and Helsingborg.
The analysis for Norway updates and extends results presented by Dahl & Lorentzen (2003a)
for an earlier time period. The study of beneﬁt dynamics for Luxembourg is the ﬁrst of its kind.
3 Institutional background
All four countries included in this study operate relatively generous minimum-income beneﬁt
systems for the working-age population.7 These are meant to guarantee a basic standard of living
to individuals with no or very limited income from other sources. Social assistance beneﬁts may
represent a person’s sole source of income or top up limited earnings from work, unemployment
beneﬁts, or other government transfers. The exception is Sweden, where social assistance is
generally not paid to supplement earnings from work but where a tax credit exists to support
low-income earners.
A deﬁning characteristic of these social assistance programmes is that they are means-tested
at the level of the ‘core family’: A spouse’s or cohabiting partner’s income and the couple’s
assets, typically beyond a certain minimum threshold, are taken into account for determining
eligibility; beneﬁts are more generous for recipients with dependent children. Beneﬁt withdrawal
with any income from work or other types of government transfers is steep: In the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden, any income earned in addition to beneﬁt payments is fully deducted from
the amount of beneﬁts received. In Luxembourg, total income may reach 130% of the guaranteed
minimum income; The implied marginal tax rate on any additional income is 100%.
While social assistance programmes are generally understood as providing temporary relief
to individuals during periods of economic hardship, the maximum duration of beneﬁt receipt in
all four countries is in principle unlimited. Beneﬁt receipt is however conditional on active job
7More detailed information on the institutional framework in these countries, see Ko¨nigs (2012) for Luxembourg
and Gustafsson (2011) for Sweden.
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search or participation in training measures. These requirements extend beyond the claimant
to other adult members of the family.8
Notable diﬀerences exist between the four countries in the degree of centralization of the
beneﬁt administration. The Luxembourg Guaranteed Minimum Income (RMG – revenu min-
imum garanti) is administered by the National Solidarity Fund (FNS) at the Ministry of Family
Aﬀairs and Integration. Minimum-income thresholds are expressed as a set of ﬁxed base rates,
the level of which depend on size and composition of the recipient family. These base rates
are then augmented by an index factor that is identical for a range of diﬀerent social paramet-
ers including the national minimum wage and pension, and that is adjusted for inﬂation at an
annual basis. Jobless RMG beneﬁt recipients are required to register with the national public
employment service and apply for participation in activation measures.
In the Netherlands, the 2004 Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB) brought about a
substantial decentralization of the social assistance (or bijstand) beneﬁt administration. Muni-
cipalities received large budgetary responsibilities along with incentives to move recipients from
social assistance into work quickly. While beneﬁt levels continue to be set by national author-
ities, the administration of beneﬁt payments and activation programmes takes place entirely
at the level of the 415 Dutch municipalities. The central government allocates two separate
budgets for reintegration measures and beneﬁt payments to the municipalities. Local author-
ities are entitled to use any money left in the budget for beneﬁt payments for other purposes,
while any excess spending on beneﬁt payments has to be covered out of own funds. The funds
in the budget for re-integration measures must be used or paid back. Job-search assistance is
provided jointly with the public employment service.
In Norway and Sweden, the administration of social assistance beneﬁts is largely decent-
ralized: The Norwegian Social Services Act of 1991 leaves the generosity of beneﬁt levels of
Social Economic Assistance (Økonomisk sosialhjelp) and the administration of payments largely
to the discretion of the municipalities. Municipal governments determine so-called social assist-
ance beneﬁt norms as guidelines about the level of monthly payments to be made to a ‘standard’
recipient. In practice, actual payments then depend on the caseworker’s assessment of the applic-
ant’s needs. Since 2001, the central government additionally provides national social assistance
norms, which are updated annually and aim at equalizing the generosity of social assistance
beneﬁt payments across municipalities. These national norms however are not binding.
The Swedish Social Assistance (Ekonomiskt bist˚and), regulated by the Social Services Act
of 1982, is ﬁnanced and administered by the municipalities. The National Board of Health and
Welfare (NBHW) provides national social assistance norms that are meant to harmonise the
level of beneﬁts across the country. Unlike for Norway, these national norms have been binding
since 1998. As important items like the cost of childcare or electricity are however not covered
by these national norms, the level of beneﬁt payouts is in practice determined by municipal
social assistance norms and the discretion of the local caseworkers.
To cover the costs of housing, low-income families in all four countries can draw on separate
housing allowance programmes. Since 2009, Luxembourg pays its low-income residents a Cost
of Living Allowance (allocation de vie che`re), which replaces the earlier Heating Allowance
8For an overview of eligibility conditions for social assistance in OECD countries, see Immervoll (2010).
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(allocation de chauﬀage). In the Netherlands, low-income families who spend a substantial part
of their income on the costs of housing are entitled to receipt of Housing Allowance (huurtoeslag ;
until 2006: huursubsidie). Means-tested housing allowances for low-income families also exist in
Norway (bostøtte) and Sweden (bostadsbidrag).
Additional income-support programmes for speciﬁc client groups exist in two of the four
countries. In the Netherlands, there are three smaller programmes targeted at older working-
age individuals, referred to as IOAW, IOAZ, and IOW.9 The main diﬀerence between these
programmes and the standard bijstand is a more generous means-test, especially in terms of the
treatment of the applicants’ assets. A means-tested Supplementary Beneﬁt (TW, Toeslagenwet)
is available for recipients of insurance-based beneﬁts who do not reach a certain minimum-income
threshold. In Norway, the Transitional Allowance (Overgangsstønad for enslige forsørgere) is a
separate minimum-income beneﬁt programme targeted at single parents with insuﬃcient means
to cover their living expenses.
Due to data limitations and for reasons of comparability, the analysis presented in this
paper focuses only on a country’s main social assistance programme for able-bodied working-
age individuals: the RMG for Luxembourg, bijstand for the Netherlands, Social Economic
Assistance for Norway and Social Assistance for Sweden. Housing Beneﬁts or any of the smaller
minimum-income beneﬁt programmes, for which receipt dynamics are likely to be diﬀerent, are
not considered.10 The same applies to programmes targeted at those unable to work.
The results presented in this paper should therefore not be interpreted as approximating
individuals’ receipt patterns of income-support beneﬁts more broadly. Many individuals may
receive unemployment beneﬁts before entering social assistance, and many will draw on other
types of income-support beneﬁts after leaving. If such moves are frequent, as it is described for
Australia by Gregory & Klug (2003) and Tseng et al. (2008), the results presented in this paper
will give a lower receipt duration and a higher frequency of repeat spells than would be observed
if other income-support beneﬁts were taken into account.
Since beneﬁt receipt in all countries is conditional on the recipient passing a means-test at
the ‘core family’ level, I categorise an individual as a beneﬁt recipient in a given period if a
positive amount of beneﬁt payments is registered for any household member in that period. For
a discussion of the advantages and limitations of this approach, see Cappellari & Jenkins (2008).
I restrict my analysis to individuals of working age, which I deﬁne as the range from 25 to 59
years. This corresponds to the usual practice in the existing work on social assistance beneﬁt
dynamics and is meant to make sure that the results are not too strongly aﬀected by individuals
9Two of these programmes take the form of unemployment assistance programmes: The Act on Income
Provision for Older and Partially-Disabled Unemployed Persons (IOAW, Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en
gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze Werknemers) provides income support to unemployed individuals who
were 50 years or older when losing their job and who have exhausted their unemployment insurance beneﬁt
entitlements. Individuals who were 60 years or older when becoming unemployed and who have exhausted their
unemployment insurance entitlements are eligible to claim beneﬁt payments in the framework of the Income
Provision for Older Unemployed Persons (IOW, Inkomensvoorziening Oudere Werklozen).
The Act on Income Provision for Older and Partially-Disabled Formerly Self-Employed Persons (IOAZ, Wet
Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte Gewezen Zelfstandigen) supplements incomes of
individuals aged 55 years or more who have been self-employed but were forced to shut down their business.
10For instance, earlier calculations showed that spell lengths for the Norwegian Transitional Allowance tend to
be very long. This probably reﬂects less stringent work requirements in particular for single parents with young
children. Housing Beneﬁt dynamics may show a similar pattern due to the typically higher income thresholds
especially for families with children.
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who enter the labour market or retire.
4 Data used
The analysis presented in this paper is based on data from four separate national administrat-
ive data sets for Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Each of them provides
information on beneﬁt receipt for the entire population of the respective country at monthly
intervals. The observation periods vary from 108 months (9 years) for Sweden to 276 months
(23 years) for Luxembourg and overlap during a window of 96 months from January 2001 to
December 2008.
Results for Luxembourg are based on a data set of social assistance beneﬁt spells collected
by the National Solidarity Fund (FNS) that administers the RMG in Luxembourg. Access was
granted by the General Inspectorate of Social Security (IGSS). The data come in the form of the
starting and end months of all beneﬁt spells between January 1988 and December 2010. They
contain records on about 30,400 beneﬁt recipients of working age, which corresponds to about
1.6 million person-month observations.11
The data for the Netherlands come from two separate databases administered by Statistics
Netherlands (CBS). The Social Statistical Database (SSB, Sociaal Statistisch Bestand) provides
precise starting and end dates of all beneﬁt spells for the Dutch resident population over the
years 1999 to 2010. I match these records into data from the municipal population registers
(GBA, Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie) that contain information on the personal and house-
hold characteristics of the entire Dutch population (recipients and non-recipients). From the
resulting population data set, I use a 0.5% random sample of individuals, which consists of about
96,000 persons (11.7 million person-month observations), 12,000 of which are beneﬁt recipients
(527,000 recipient-months).12 All data work was done on-site at CBS in The Hague.
For Norway, I use data from the Social Security Event-History Database (FD-Trygd) that
is administered by Statistics Norway. This dataset provides information on beneﬁt receipt
for the entire Norwegian population for the years 1993 to 2008. I work with a 10% random
sample from the population, which translates into 323,000 individuals (41.9 million person-month
observations) of whom 46,000 are beneﬁt recipients (883,000 recipient-month observations).13
For Sweden, data come from the Social Assistance register maintained and made available
by the National Board of Health and Welfare. This data set provides monthly information on
11The full observation period even extends from November 1986 to February 2012. The data appear to be less
reliable however at the beginning and towards the end of the observation period such that I do not use them (for
additional details, see Ko¨nigs (2012)). I am not aware of any earlier research papers that use the FNS data. The
IGSS however publishes statistics on trends in beneﬁt receipt derived from FNS data in its annual reports (IGSS,
2012).
12To my knowledge, the only existing study of social assistance dynamics using SSB data is from Zorlu (2013),
who estimates standard probit models to examine the determinants of beneﬁt receipt for a cross-section of ﬁrst-
and second-generation immigrants in 2005.
13FD-Trygd has been used extensively to study social assistance beneﬁt receipt: Dahl & Lorentzen (2003a)
analyse the length of beneﬁt spells in Norway using monthly data over an eight-year period from 1992 to 1999.
Hansen (2009) also looks at social assistance spell lengths for the years 1992 to 2002 however annualizes the
monthly data on beneﬁt receipt. FD-Trygd data have also been used to study exits from beneﬁt receipt (Dahl &
Lorentzen, 2003b), state dependence in beneﬁt receipt (Bhuller, Brinch & Ko¨nigs, 2014), the eﬀects of ALMPs
on social assistance dynamics (Dahl & Lorentzen, 2005; Lorentzen & Dahl, 2005), social assistance dependency
over the life cycle (Hyggen, 2006; Lorentzen, Dahl & Harsløf, 2011) and across generations (Lorentzen, 2010).
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beneﬁt receipt for the years from 2001 to 2009. Over this period, the population of beneﬁt
recipients consists of about 530,000 individuals, which translates into about 10.5 million person-
month observations.14
All four data sets permit linking individuals with other members in the same household
based on a household identiﬁer, which allows me to deﬁne the beneﬁt receipt variable at the
household level. The data also provide limited information on the demographic characteristics
of sample members, notably their sex, age, nationality / country of origin, and family status
(except for Luxembourg). The Norwegian data can in principle be matched with information
on educational attainment, a feature which however I do not make use of since no comparable
data are available for the other countries. For a description of all variables used in this paper
see Appendix A.2, Table A.1.
Since the data for Luxembourg and Sweden only contain information on individuals for as
long as they receive beneﬁts (and no records for non-recipients), I use annual statistics on the
size of the working-age population provided by the OECD (2013) for the calculation of receipt
rates and entry rates into beneﬁts.15
5 Trends in aggregate beneﬁt dynamics
Due to the lack of suitable panel data with monthly observations, much of the existing work
on social assistance beneﬁt dynamics is based on annual data taken from household surveys
(Cappellari & Jenkins (2014), Ko¨nigs (2014)) or administrative records (Finnie & Irvine (2008);
Andre´n & Andre´n (2013); Hansen, Lofstrom, Liu & Zhang (2014)). While analyses based on
annual data can provide important insights about the frequency of beneﬁt receipt, its trends over
time, and the most important recipient groups, the minimum period of beneﬁt entitlement is in
reality shorter than a year in most countries.16 Annual data on beneﬁt receipt can therefore only
give an approximate representation of the underlying dynamic processes, and trends in beneﬁt
receipt observed in annual data may not always adequately reﬂect the beneﬁt dynamics at the
monthly level.
This section provides a short overview of the aggregate beneﬁt receipt dynamics in Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Its main purpose is to provide some background to
the analysis of individual-level receipt dynamics presented in the following section. By presenting
comparable results for both monthly and annualized data, it also permits determining to what
14Two earlier studies use the Swedish NBHW database to analyze social assistance beneﬁt receipt: Bergmark
& Ba¨ckman (2004) study re-entries into beneﬁt receipt of social assistance leavers, however restrict their analysis
to annual data for the years 1990 to 1999. Ba¨ckman & Bergmark (2011) use the monthly data to study duration
dependence in social assistance receipt over the period from 2002 to 2004.
15To assess the robustness of the results, I have replicated the analysis for Norway using the same annual OECD
population statistics (rather than the monthly population numbers constructed from the FD-Trygd sample), and
I ﬁnd that this leaves the results virtually unaﬀected. Over the period from January 2001 to December 2008, the
largest diﬀerence found in any given month between the beneﬁt receipt rates calculated using those two sources
of population numbers is 0.03 percentage points; entry rates derived using the two sources of population numbers
diﬀer by less than 0.01 percentage points in each month. It thus seems reasonable to use aggregate population
statistics to calculate beneﬁt receipt rates and entry rates for Luxembourg and Sweden where no micro-based
population numbers are available.
16In Norway and Sweden for instance, individuals are usually required to re-conﬁrm the circumstances that
justify beneﬁt receipt every month. Ayala & Rodriguez (2007a,b) by contrast report that the beneﬁts of Madrid’s
Minimum Income programme (IMI) are granted for one year, renewable automatically.
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extent the conclusions drawn from data at diﬀerent levels of time aggregation are consistent.
5.1 Rates of beneﬁt receipt
Rates of social assistance beneﬁt receipt diﬀer across countries in both levels and trends over the
observation period (Figure 1). The share of working-age individuals receiving beneﬁts declines
in two of the four countries: In the Netherlands, the receipt rate falls from over 5% in the late
1990s to around 4% in the late 2000s, in Norway it decreases from around 2.5% in the early
1990s to below 2% in the late 2000s.17 Beneﬁt receipt rates are relatively stable for Sweden,
where they ﬂuctuate around 2% to 2.5%. In Luxembourg, receipt rates increase from around
1% in the late 1980s to over 4% in 2011.
The declining beneﬁt receipt rates for the Netherlands and Norway match similar downward
trends for other countries. Cappellari & Jenkins (2014) and Hansen et al. (2014) report a decline
in beneﬁt receipt rates in Britain and Canada, respectively. In both cases, receipt rates peaked
at around 12% the mid-1990s to fall to about 6% in Britain and 8% in Canada in the mid-
2000s.18 For the United States, Scholz, Moﬃtt & Cowan (2009) ﬁnd a 50% drop in caseload
numbers of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) from its introduction in 1996 to
2007.19
These downward trends likely reﬂect a combination of diﬀerent factors. One possible driver
are policy reforms, notably stricter eligibility requirements and a greater focus on the activation
of employable beneﬁt recipients. At least in part, the fall in receipt rates however certainly also
reﬂects an improvement in the general economic environment after the economic downturn of
the early 1990s with negative GDP growth rates in Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. The rising rates of beneﬁt receipt in Luxembourg can be understood in the context of
the gradual expansion of the RMG after its introduction in 1986, with increasing take-up rates,
looser eligibility conditions, and greater beneﬁt generosity (Ko¨nigs, 2012). A discussion of cor-
responding changes in the composition of the recipient population is provided in Appendix A.1.
There is no evidence of seasonality in beneﬁt receipt for working-age individuals in any of the
four countries despite relatively strong month-to-month ﬂuctuations in receipt rates especially in
Norway and Sweden.20 Figure 2 plots the average rate of beneﬁt receipt in each calendar month
over all years of the observation period. The lines for all four countries are essentially ﬂat, which
implies that there is very little systematic variation in rates of beneﬁt receipt between calendar
months. Any month-to-month ﬂuctuations in beneﬁt receipt observed in monthly receipt rates
for Sweden and Norway thus represent ‘noise’ rather than seasonal eﬀects.
Figure 3 presents annualized beneﬁt receipt rates. To construct these rates from the monthly
data, I have employed the ‘beneﬁt year’ approach used in much of the existing literature classi-
fying an individual as a recipient in a given calendar year if any beneﬁt payments are recorded
17In the Netherlands, the decline in receipt rates was much stronger in the late 1990s, for which however no
monthly data are available (see Immervoll et al. (2014)).
18The beneﬁt programmes taken into account are Social Assistance in Canada and Income Support or Unem-
ployment Beneﬁts / Jobseeker’s Allowance in Britain.
19TANF is the successor of the AFDC programme mentioned in Section 2 and was introduced in 1996 by the Clin-
ton administration through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
20For Norway and Sweden, this result changes if the bottom age threshold is lowered from 25 years to also
include individuals in their early 20s. In this case, rates of beneﬁt receipt rise considerably over the summer
months as young adults ﬂow into social assistance to bridge gaps in their educational schedules.
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Figure 1: Rates of beneﬁt receipt – monthly data
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Note: Receipt rates measure the share of working-age individuals (25-59 years) who receive beneﬁts in a given
period. Calculations are based on administrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database, 1988-2010), the Nether-
lands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway (FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database, 2001-2009). For Luxem-
bourg and Sweden, I calculate receipt rates by combining micro data on recipient numbers with annual aggregate
statistics on the size of the working-age population in these countries (OECD, 2013).
Figure 2: Rates of beneﬁt receipt – seasonality
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Note: See note to Figure 1. Seasonality is measured as the receipt rate for a given calendar month averaged over
all years of the respective observation period.
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Figure 3: Rates of beneﬁt receipt – annual(ized) data
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Note: Annual receipt rates measure the share of working-age individuals (25-59 years) who receive beneﬁts at any
time in a given year. Calculations are based on administrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database, 1988-2010),
the Netherlands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway (FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database, 1990-2009).
To calculate receipt rates for Luxembourg and Sweden, I combine micro data on recipient numbers with annual
aggregate statistics on the size of the working-age population in these countries (OECD, 2013).
during that year. For Sweden, I moreover present results for the years 1990 to 2000 for which
only annual data are available. The numbers can be compared directly for instance to those
presented by Finnie & Irvine (2008) or Hansen et al. (2014) for Canada or by Andre´n & Andre´n
(2013) for Sweden.21
Unsurprisingly, annualized receipt rates are much higher than their corresponding monthly
counterparts. This reﬂects the fact that the share of individuals who receive beneﬁt payments
at any time during the year must be greater than the ‘instantaneous’ receipt rate in any month
of that year. The ratio between the annualized and monthly receipt rates provides a measure of
the ‘turnover’ in beneﬁt receipt during the calendar year. This result is summarized in Table 1.
Turnover in beneﬁt receipt is much lower in Luxembourg and the Netherlands that in Norway
or Sweden. In the former two countries, the annual rate of beneﬁt receipt is about 25% higher
than the average monthly rate of beneﬁt receipt (column IV of Table 1). Over the course
of a year, and for a stable annual rate of beneﬁt receipt, about 25% of all Luxembourg and
Dutch recipients at the beginning of a year thus leave beneﬁts and are ‘replaced’ by new beneﬁt
entrants. The corresponding ﬁgures are substantially higher for the two Nordic countries: In
Sweden, the share of individuals who receive beneﬁts at any time during the year is 73% higher
than the average monthly rate of beneﬁt receipt. In Norway, the recipient population on average
completely changes more than once during a calendar year.
21Meanwhile, the numbers are not directly comparable to those reported by Cappellari & Jenkins (2014) for
the United Kingdom or Ko¨nigs (2014) for Germany, who use survey data and measure beneﬁt receipt rates at the
interview date only.
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Table 1: Monthly and annualized rates of social assistance beneﬁt receipt
country
average monthly rate average annual rate ratio of columns
of beneﬁt receipt in % of beneﬁt receipt in % III and II
Luxembourg 2.4 3.0 1.22
Netherlands 4.2 5.3 1.26
Norway 2.1 4.7 2.23
Sweden 3.2 5.5 1.73
Note: Calculations are based on administrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database, 1988-2010), the Nether-
lands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway (FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database, 2001-2009). For Luxem-
bourg and Sweden, I calculate receipt rates by combining micro data on recipient numbers with annual aggregate
statistics on the size of the working-age population in these countries (OECD, 2013).
The results demonstrate that relatively similar average monthly rates of beneﬁt receipt in
Luxembourg and Norway can go hand in hand with very diﬀerent degrees of turnover and, hence,
beneﬁt durations (an aspect studied in more detail in Section 6). Annual rates of beneﬁt receipt
calculated using the ‘beneﬁt year’ approach (as presented in Figure 3) tend to give a much better
measure of the frequency of beneﬁt receipt at any point in time if the month-to-month turnover
in beneﬁt receipt is low.
The numbers can also be used to illustrate that especially where turnover is high, a greater
share of the population may be in social assistance for at least a short period at some point
during their lives. For instance, 10.2% of working-age individuals in Norway who were in the
sample for the eight-year period from 2001 to 2008 received beneﬁts at least once during that
time (not shown). This share is more than ﬁve times the average monthly rate of beneﬁt receipt
of 1.9% among the same individuals. In the Netherlands, the average monthly receipt rate
among individuals observed for the same eight years is 3.9%, but 9.8% of individuals receive
beneﬁts at some point during this period. In both countries, the number of individuals who draw
on social assistance at some point is thus much higher than the low monthly receipt rate may
suggest. At least for some individuals, beneﬁt receipt thus tends to be a transitory phenomenon.
‘Recipients’ and ‘non-recipients’ should thus not necessarily be considered as two very distinct
groups.
5.2 Beneﬁt transition rates
The trends in beneﬁt receipt rates can be linked to transition rates into and out of beneﬁts. For
this purpose, I deﬁne an entry rate as the number of individuals who receive beneﬁts at time t
and who did not receive beneﬁts in t-1 as a percentage of the non-recipient population in period
t-1. Analogously, I deﬁne an exit rate as the number of individuals who do not receive beneﬁts
in period t but who received beneﬁts in t-1, as a share of all beneﬁt recipients in t-1. As the
data for Sweden and Luxembourg do not include non-recipients, I use again OECD statistics
on the size of the working-age population in these countries for the calculation of entry rates
(OECD, 2013). Figures 4-6 plot month-to-month beneﬁt transition rates, seasonal variations in
transition rates, and annualized transition rates calculated from the monthly data, respectively.
The larger turnover in beneﬁt receipt in the Nordic countries observed in Table 1 is reﬂected
in much higher beneﬁt transition rates. In Norway and Sweden, around 0.5% and 0.4% of non-
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recipients, respectively, enter beneﬁts from one month to the next (upper panel of Figure 4).
In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the corresponding average monthly entry rates are much
lower at around 0.1%. Similar disparities are observed for exit rates: In Norway and Sweden,
around 25% and 15% of recipients in a given month leave beneﬁts in the next month, compared
to below 3% of Dutch recipients and not even 1.5% of recipients in Luxembourg (bottom panel).
Trends in beneﬁt receipt rates observed in Figure 1 appear to be driven primarily by changes
in entry rates. In Norway, the decline in the receipt rate coincides with a fall in the entry rate
while the exit rate remains relatively stable. In Luxembourg, where the receipt rate increased,
a similar rise can be observed in the entry rate again at stable exit rates. These results again
conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings for Canada (Finnie & Irvine, 2008) and Britain (Cappellari & Jenkins,
2014), who report that declining beneﬁt receipt rates coincide with falling entry rates into beneﬁt
receipt while exit rates remain stable or even drop. The pattern diﬀers however in the two other
countries: Figure 1 shows a decline in the receipt rate for the Netherlands, yet both entry and
exit rates remained relatively stable over the observation period. The decline in beneﬁt receipt
thus represents a move towards a new ‘equilibrium receipt rate’.22 For Sweden, a stable receipt
rate is associated with declines in both entry and receipt rates.
Like the beneﬁt receipt rates, also beneﬁt transition rates display a perhaps unexpected lack
of seasonality (Figure 5). While there are some ﬂuctuations across calendar months, the only
systematic patterns appear to be the somewhat higher exit rates from beneﬁts in January and
in the summer months for the two Nordic countries. For Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the
low observed exit rates and the lack of seasonality in entries and exits hint at long beneﬁt spell
lengths. Overall, the large ﬂuctuations in month-to month beneﬁt transition rates observed for
all four countries in Figure 4 thus do not reﬂect seasonality in beneﬁt receipt.
The patterns in beneﬁt transition rates are remarkably well preserved when the data are
aggregated to the annual level (Figure 6). Annual entry rates show similar trends as their
monthly counterparts, declining for Norway and Sweden, remaining stable for the Netherlands,
and rising for Luxembourg. Similarly, exit rates calculated from the annualized data display the
same lack of trend observed for monthly exit rates.
Annual transition rates can be thought of describing the beneﬁt dynamics purged of any
short-term turnover: Annual entry rates consider beneﬁt receipt of those individuals who did
not receive any payments last year, which means that they do take into account direct re-entries
of beneﬁt leavers. Similarly, annual exit rates do not reﬂect short-term departures from beneﬁts
but only consider exits that last for one year at least. The much lower cross-country disparities in
the level of annual transition rates compared to the monthly rates thus imply that a substantial
share of the month-to-month transitions observed for the two Nordics are only temporary.
An implication of these beneﬁt transition rates is that observed state dependence in beneﬁt
receipt is strong: Even for Norway, where beneﬁt transition rates are highest, monthly-to-month
persistence rates of around 75% are considerably higher than the corresponding entry rates of
about 0.5%. While most of this gap between beneﬁt persistence and entry rates likely reﬂects
diﬀerences in characteristics between recipients and non-recipients, it raises concerns about
22At an average monthly entry rate of 0.12% and an average exit rate of 2.86%, the receipt rate at which entries
equal exits is at 4%. This roughly corresponds to the receipt rate attained towards the end of the observation
period.
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Figure 4: Beneﬁt transition rates – monthly data
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Note: Entry rates are deﬁned as the number of individuals who receive beneﬁts in period t and who did not
receive beneﬁts in t-1 divided by the total number of non-recipients in t-1. Exit rates are deﬁned accordingly as
the number of individuals who do not receive beneﬁts in period t but who received beneﬁts in t-1 as a fraction
of all beneﬁt recipients in t-1. Calculations are based on administrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database,
1988-2010), the Netherlands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway (FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database,
2001-2009). For Luxembourg and Sweden, I calculate receipt rates by combining micro data on recipient numbers
with annual aggregate statistics on the size of the working-age population in these countries (OECD, 2013).
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Figure 5: Beneﬁt transition rates – seasonality
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Note: See note to Figure 4. Seasonality is measured as the transition rate for a given calendar month averaged
over all years of the respective observation period.
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Figure 6: Beneﬁt transition rates – annual(ized) data
0
1
2
3
e
n
try
 ra
te
 in
 %
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year of observation
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden
entry rates
0
10
20
30
40
e
xi
t r
at
e 
in
 %
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year of observation
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden
exit rates
Note: See note to Figure 4.
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possible ‘scarring’ eﬀects and motivates research on the drivers of state dependence in beneﬁt
receipt (see for instance Bhuller et al. (2014)).
6 The micro-dynamics of beneﬁt receipt
The aggregate beneﬁt receipt rates and transition rates presented in the previous section suggest
that the degree of ‘turnover’ in beneﬁts – and thus the length of beneﬁt spells – diﬀers across
the four countries studied. In this section, I take a spell-based perspective to show how these
aggregate-level diﬀerences are reﬂected in individual-level beneﬁt receipt dynamics. To ensure
that the results are comparable across countries, I limit my analysis to the eight years from
January 2001 to December 2008 during which the observation periods of all four data sets
overlap.23 The samples are restricted to beneﬁt spells of individuals who are of working age
(25-59 years) at the beginning of their spell.
6.1 The deﬁnition of a beneﬁt spell
The advantage of using monthly data for an analysis of beneﬁt dynamics is that spell lengths
can be measured with precision, and that even very short spells can be easily identiﬁed in the
data. A contentious issue in the existing literature on the duration of beneﬁt receipt has been,
however, how short interruptions in receipt should be dealt with when spells are deﬁned. Short
periods without beneﬁt receipt may not represent actual exits from beneﬁts but may result from
‘administrative churning’, for instance caused by delays in beneﬁt pay-outs or errors in data
entry. In this case, they should arguably be corrected for.
Even if data have been recorded correctly, a case can be made for ignoring short exits
from beneﬁt receipt because they may not represent genuine departures from a situation of
dependency. Kazepov (1999) suggests that one should really be concerned with dependence
episodes, which he deﬁnes as periods of beneﬁt receipt that might span multiple cash episodes
(i.e. beneﬁt spells) interrupted by short times without beneﬁt receipt. Blank (1989) ignores
interruptions in beneﬁt receipt of up to three months unless she can link them to changes in
employment status or income, and a similar approach is taken in most of the later work on the
topic.
I choose to employ a diﬀerent approach by deﬁning a beneﬁt spell as a period during which a
positive amount of beneﬁt payments is observed for every single month. The spell is thus coded
as having ended as soon as no beneﬁt payment is recorded. The justiﬁcation for this approach
is that – as we will see – a large share of the observed beneﬁt spells in the two Nordic countries
are of very short duration, and that it is not obvious why short spells on and oﬀ beneﬁts should
be treated asymmetrically. To illustrate the robustness of my ﬁndings, I also report results
obtained when ignoring interruptions in beneﬁt receipt of two months or less. Unlike it is done
by previous authors, I however do not count these interruptions as contributing towards the
length of the beneﬁt spell.24
23Results for the entire observation periods are provided by Immervoll et al. (2014).
24For instance, an individual might be observed as receiving beneﬁts for two times four months interrupted
by a period without payments of two months. In my analysis, such an episode would be classiﬁed as either two
separate spells of four months or as a single spell of eight months. Gustafsson et al. (2002) for instance would
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6.2 Hazard rates
A plot of the hazard rates of exits from and re-entries into beneﬁt receipt can provide a ﬁrst
overview of the beneﬁt transition dynamics at the individual level. The upper panel of Figure 7
presents the hazard rate out of beneﬁts among recipients who started their spell during the
observation period. The lower panel shows the corresponding hazard rate from non-receipt into
beneﬁts for those who have ended a spell of beneﬁt receipt.25
In all four countries, hazard rates from beneﬁt receipt show the typical declining pattern
indicating that the probability of leaving beneﬁts in a given period (conditional on not yet
having left in any of the previous periods) falls with increased duration of beneﬁt receipt. Exit
probabilities however diﬀer substantially across the four countries: In Norway and Sweden, the
period-speciﬁc exit rate from beneﬁts is above 30% per month in the beginning of a beneﬁt
spell but strongly declines to around 10% after 12 months and further to around 5% after 36
months. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, exit probabilities are much lower to start with
and consequently decline less strongly.
Re-entry hazards, i.e. the exit rates from self-suﬃciency among those with a previous beneﬁt
spell, tend to be lower but show a very similar pattern. In the two Nordic countries, re-entry
rates are much higher in the early periods of a spell oﬀ beneﬁts declining from around 25% in
the initial months to 2-3% at 12 months and 1% at 24 months and thereafter. In Luxembourg
and the Netherlands, re-entry rates of beneﬁt leavers are only around 6% per month already
at the beginning of a spell oﬀ beneﬁts and decline less strongly. 18 months after the end of a
beneﬁt spell, the re-entry hazard rates in all four countries have practically converged.
The hazard rates’ declining patterns of course cannot be interpreted as evidence for dur-
ation dependence. The fall in exit rates with increased spell length likely reﬂects primarily
compositional eﬀects as individuals with favourable characteristics leave social assistance more
quickly. Rapidly falling hazard rates from self-suﬃciency back into beneﬁts indicate that a large
share of departures from social assistance only represent short interruptions in beneﬁt receipt,
potentially as individuals seize short-term employment opportunities, or indeed as a result of
administrative churning.
The larger exit and re-entry probabilities in the two Nordic countries, especially at the be-
ginning of a spell, reﬂect the higher aggregate month-to-month beneﬁt transition rates observed
in Figure 4. As shown below, they also imply much shorter spell lengths and a higher share of
individuals with multiple beneﬁt spells.
6.3 The length of beneﬁt spells – evidence from long panels
To assess the incidence of long-term beneﬁt dependence, I study the distribution of spell lengths
over the time from January 2001 to December 2008. Table 2 presents an overview of the lengths
of all beneﬁt spells that start during the eight-year observation period. Spells that are ongoing
in December 2008 are counted as right-censored but included in the calculations. Left-censoring
is not an issue for inﬂow samples.
record a single spell of ten months.
25For consistency, I restrict the sample to spells of non-receipt that follow a beneﬁt spell which started during
the observation period.
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Figure 7: Hazard rates
0
10
20
30
40
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 e
xit
 fr
om
 b
en
ef
its
 in
 %
0 12 24 36
duration since entry into benefits in months
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden
exits
0
10
20
30
40
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 re
−e
nt
ry
 in
to
 b
en
ef
its
 in
 %
0 12 24 36
duration since exit from benefits in months
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden
re−entries
Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data for the period January 2001 to December 2008 from
Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd), and Sweden (NBHW database). The
exit hazard rate gives the probability of leaving beneﬁts at a given spell length conditional on not having left
in any of the earlier periods. Analogously, the re-entry hazard rate gives the probability of re-entering among
welfare leavers after a given duration oﬀ beneﬁts conditional on not having re-entered in an earlier period.
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Observed spell lengths diﬀer substantially across countries. Beneﬁt spells are generally re-
latively short in Norway and Sweden but much longer in the Netherlands and Luxembourg
(Table 2, panel A). The average length of a beneﬁt spell in the sample varies from below 4
months in Norway to 23 months, i.e. nearly 2 years, in Luxembourg. Median lengths indicate
that short-term beneﬁt receipt is the norm in Norway and Sweden, where 50% of all spells are
of length 2 months or shorter. By contrast, for the Netherlands and Luxembourg, half of all
beneﬁt spells last at least 9 and 14 months, respectively.
The duration of beneﬁt receipt is also heterogeneous across spells within countries. In all
four countries, at least a small proportion of recorded spells last very long. In Luxembourg, 57%
of all spells are longer than 12 months and 35% last two years or longer. In the Netherlands,
close to one out of four spells lasts longer than 24 months. In Norway and Sweden, where mean
and median spell lengths are short, only about 2% and 4% of all spells, respectively, last for 24
months or longer.
Despite the long observation period, a substantial fraction of spells in Luxembourg and
the Netherlands are right-censored. The observed spell length until the end of the observation
period will therefore generally be shorter than the true spell length. Since I include right-
censored spells in my calculations, the already long average spell lengths calculated for these
countries still underestimate true spell lengths. Similarly, the diﬀerences in spell lengths between
the Nordics and the Netherlands and Luxembourg is likely to be greater still than the numbers
in Table 2 suggest.
Ignoring short exits from beneﬁts in the calculation of spell lengths does not strongly aﬀect
results. Median spell lengths change little, remaining stable for the Netherlands and Norway,
increasing by 1 month for Sweden and by 2 months for Luxembourg (Table 2, panel B). By
contrast, measured average spell lengths rise by about 75% for the two Nordic countries from
3.8 to 6.7 months in Norway and from 5.0 to 8.8 months in Sweden. This increase is reﬂected in
the measured durations of long beneﬁt spells. The proportion of spells that last 24 months or
longer rises from 3.8% to 10.8% in Sweden and more than triples from 2.0% to 6.4% in Norway.
For the Netherlands and Luxembourg, ignoring short exits from beneﬁt receipt does not have a
major eﬀect on average spell lengths. This reﬂects the ﬁnding from Figure 7 that beneﬁt leavers
in these countries are much less likely to return to beneﬁts quickly.
It is interesting to compare the presented spell lengths with those found in earlier studies.
Blank (1989) reports in her analysis of AFDC-receipt in Denver and Seattle that 62% of the
completed spells for a household ended within a year, with an average duration of beneﬁt
payments of 13 months. She however does not include the 36% of right-censored spells in these
calculations, which generally have a longer duration until censoring. Fitzgerald (1991) calculates
a much longer median AFDC beneﬁt spell length of 20 months over a shorter observation period
(32 months), but calculates a median spell length of 11-12 months for receipt of AFDC and
Food Stamps in a follow-up study (Fitzgerald, 1995). Also Hoynes (2000) reports higher AFDC
spell lengths for California, where 46% of spells end within 12 months and 62% end within 24
months. The ﬁnding of relatively high AFDC spell lengths, at least compared to spell lengths in
Norway and Sweden, is maybe not so surprising since the U.S. AFDC primarily targeted highly
disadvantaged single mothers, whom we would generally expect to remain on welfare for longer.
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More recent and comparable results are presented by Gustafsson et al. (2002) in their study
of social assistance dynamics in eight European cities. For a 42-month period starting in the late
1980s or early 1990s, they report median spell lengths of around 4 months for an individual’s
ﬁrst observed spell in Gothenburg and Helsingborg and of 5-6 months for Bremen, Milan and
Turin. By contrast, median spell lengths are 1 year for Vitoria, over 2 years for Barcelona and
nearly 3 years for Lisbon. The results for Helsingborg and Gothenburg are relatively close to
the ones reported in Table 2 for Sweden. The median durations for Barcelona and Lisbon are
much longer, which, as Gustafsson et al. (2002) suggest, may reﬂect stricter means-tests and
thus more disadvantaged recipient populations in these cities.
My results are remarkably similar to those reported by Dahl & Lorentzen (2003a) who study
beneﬁt spell lengths in Norway using the same data set for an earlier period. For their sample
of spells that start in 1995, they calculate median and mean spell lengths of 2 and 4 months,
respectively, and a 94%-share of spells that last 12 months or shorter (p. 295, Table 6). These
numbers are nearly identical to those that I present in Table 2 for a later and longer time period.
My ﬁndings for the Netherlands by contrast diﬀer from those reported by Snel et al. (2013)
for bijstand receivers in the Dutch city of Rotterdam. For the 1999 inﬂow cohort, they calculate
a median spell length of 23 months (p.184, Table 5), which is more than double the 9 months
that I report in Table 2 for the country as a whole. Similarly, they calculate that only 35% of
beneﬁts spells last one year or less, compared to around 58% of spells with a duration below 12
months in my analysis.
Even though the beneﬁt receipt rate in urban Rotterdam is two to three times as high as
the one for the country as a whole, heterogeneity in spell lengths within the country does not
appear to be responsible for the diﬀerences in ﬁndings. I use the postcode information in the
SSB data to restrict my sample to recipients who live in city of Rotterdam at the beginning of
their spell. Over the eight-year period, I calculate median and mean spell lengths of 10 months
and 21 months, respectively. 53% of all spells last longer than 12 months. These numbers are
only a little higher than those reported in Table 2 for the entire country and thus still much
lower than those reported by Snel et al.. Since there are no apparent diﬀerences in methodology
or sample selection between the two studies, the much higher spell lengths calculated by Snel
et al. might simply be due to diﬀerent observation periods. More speciﬁcally, the 1999 inﬂows
sample used by Snel et al. was drawn before the start of my observation period and at a time
when beneﬁt receipt rates were still much higher.26 The diﬀerences in spell lengths in the two
studies might thus hint at a positive relation between spell lengths and the receipt rate at the
start of a spell. Unfortunately, it was until now beyond the scope of this project to study this
aspect in more detail.
6.4 The length of beneﬁt spells – a cross-sectional perspective
The analysis of beneﬁt spell lengths just presented is based on a sample of all inﬂows over an
eight-year observation period. Data required for such an analysis are however rarely available.
Policy debates about beneﬁt dependence therefore commonly refer to the duration of on-going
26Based on the SSB data, I calculate a beneﬁt receipt rate for the city of Rotterdam of 15.5% in 1999, compared
to 11.9% over the years 2001 to 2008 which I look at.
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Table 3: The length of beneﬁt spells – stock vs. ﬂow samples
country sample
# of duration in months share of censored
spells median mean spells in %
Luxembourg
stock 8,516 60 60.4 59.1
inﬂows 288 13 21.8 21.6
outﬂows 138 13 18.6 9.4
Netherlands
stock 1,869 67 63.2 64.1
inﬂows 67 12 20.5 23.9
outﬂows 39 9 18.8 23.1
Norway
stock 6,739 9 16.7 6.4
inﬂows 1,747 2 4.3 0.6
outﬂows 1,541 2 3.7 0.3
Sweden
stock 92,607 17 26.2 15.1
inﬂows 13,681 2 5.5 1.6
outﬂows 18,289 3 6.2 1.6
Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Neth-
erlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd), and Sweden (NBHW database) over the period from January 2001 to
December 2008. I use the term stock sample to refer to a sample of spells that are ongoing in January 2005.
Inﬂow and outﬂow samples are the samples of spells starting and ending in January 2005, respectively.
spells measured at a single point in time. In particular, discussions are often concerned with
the proportion of long-term recipients among those currently in receipt of beneﬁts. Conclusions
based on such cross-sectional samples can be highly misleading.
In their seminal study on the length of welfare beneﬁt spells in the U.S., Bane & Ellwood
(1994) emphasise that in a cross-sectional sample, a snapshot of all on-going spells (a sample
of ‘stocks’) will yield very diﬀerent spell lengths than a sample of all spells that start or end in
that period (samples of ‘ﬂows’). To illustrate the importance of this point, I re-produce part of
the analysis done by Bane & Ellwood to provide evidence on the gap in measured spell lengths
when comparing stock and ﬂow samples for the four countries studied in this paper.27
Table 3 shows the length of beneﬁt spells for each country measured at a single point in
time calculated for (i) a sample of on-going spells, (ii) a sample of starting spells, and (iii) a
sample of ending spells. To minimise the impact of censoring, I use for my calculations the wave
in the middle of the observation period, i.e. January 2005. In all three samples, I account for
short exits from beneﬁts (as in the ‘standard sample’ used for panel A of Table 2). The results
are however robust to choosing diﬀerent sampling waves and to ignoring short interruptions in
beneﬁt receipt.
Both median and mean spell lengths in the stock samples of on-going spells are much higher
than for samples of either inﬂows or outﬂows.28 The magnitude of this eﬀect varies, but is
considerable for each of the four countries. The gap between mean durations is largest in
27Bane & Ellwood use annual data from the PSID to calculate the beneﬁt spell length in years for an inﬂow
sample, and compare these numbers to estimated spell lengths for a ‘point-in-time’ sample under the assumption
that beneﬁt dynamics are in steady state. For an earlier empirical illustration of this point, see Dahl & Lorentzen
(2003a)
28Table 3 shows that in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway, where the number of recipients has risen in
January 2005, spell lengths are higher in the inﬂow than in the outﬂow sample. The opposite is true for Sweden,
where the number of outﬂows surpasses the number of inﬂows, and where spell lengths are shorter in the inﬂow
sample. In equilibrium, the measured spell lengths in inﬂow and outﬂow samples are equal on expectation.
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Sweden, where the spells that are on-going in January 2005 last 26 months on average, while the
average length of spells starting in that same month is nearly one ﬁfth of this (5.5 months). The
gap between median durations is larger still: For the Netherlands, 50% of all on-going spells in
January 2005 lasted 67 months or longer while the median length of spells that start and end in
that same month are only 12 and 9 months, respectively. These numbers still underestimate the
true size of the gap because a much larger fraction of spells in the stock samples are censored.29
The explanation for this striking result is that longer spells are overrepresented in samples
of on-going spells. Any non-censored spell is included in exactly one inﬂow and one outﬂow
sample, while possibly being part of a multitude of separate stock samples for diﬀerent waves
(depending on the spell’s length). This is equivalent to saying that each stock sample includes
a disproportionately large number of long spells.
Any inference on spell lengths that is based on a sample of on-going spells will therefore
overestimate the issue of long-term beneﬁt dependence. The large share of long beneﬁt spells
in stock samples by contrast correctly indicates that long-term recipients are responsible for
the most signiﬁcant part of social assistance caseloads and thus of the expenditures for beneﬁt
payments in a given period (Bane & Ellwood, 1994).
6.5 Repeat spells and time until re-entry
An important aspect related to the length of beneﬁt spells is whether individuals remain self-
suﬃcient once they have stopped receiving beneﬁts, or how long it takes until they return to
beneﬁt receipt. As seen, individual beneﬁt spells in the Nordic countries tend to be much shorter
than in Luxembourg or the Netherlands. However, Figure 7 indicated that individuals in Norway
and Sweden return to beneﬁts more quickly after having left the beneﬁt rolls. This subsection
quantiﬁes the size of this eﬀect by studying the number of beneﬁt spells per individual and the
time until re-entry.
One diﬃculty that arises in such an analysis is that the panel used previously for the cal-
culation of beneﬁt spell lengths is unbalanced. Since the analysis is based on a sample from
the working-age population, individuals enter the sample late (by turning 25 years old after
January 2001) or leave early (by turning 60 before December 2008). The magnitude of this
eﬀect is non-negligible: For Norway, I for instance calculate that over the period from 2001 to
2008 less than two-thirds of individuals in the sample are observed for the full 96 waves. The
average observation period is 76 waves, i.e. a bit above six out of the eight years. As a result,
the number of spells per individual counted in the data will be an underestimate of what would
be observed if the sample were balanced.
To address this problem, I restrict the sample to individuals who are of working age during
the entire observation period. Individuals who join the panel late or drop out early for age-
related reasons are excluded. The resulting sample is balanced except for individuals who leave
the data set due to migration or death.30 Results from the analysis are presented in Table 4.
To test the sensitivity of the results to the sample selection criteria, I replicate my calculations
29The stock sample suﬀers from both a right- and left-censoring problem, while the spells in the inﬂow or
outﬂow sample can only be either right- or left-censored.
30The reason why I do not construct a truly balanced sample is that for Luxembourg and Sweden, I cannot
observe whether an individual who does not receive beneﬁts remains in the sample.
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Table 4: The number of beneﬁt spells per individual
Panel A – standard sample
# of # of spells share of individuals in %
of recipients median mean with 2 spells with 5 spells
Luxembourg 12,056 1 1.4 29.0 0.5
Netherlands 2,572 1 1.4 25.9 0.5
Norway 19,900 3 4.2 70.6 33.8
Sweden 348,806 2 3.6 67.1 27.1
Panel B – ignoring short exits
# of # of spells share of individuals in %
of recipients median mean with 2 spells with 5 spells
Luxembourg 12,056 1 1.3 23.1 0.1
Netherlands 2,572 1 1.3 21.2 0.1
Norway 19,990 2 2.3 56.3 11.4
Sweden 348,824 1 2.0 47.1 6.9
Note: Calculations are for the period from January 2001 to December 2008 and based on monthly administrat-
ive data from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd) and Sweden (NBHW
database). The sample is limited to individuals aged at least 25 years at the beginning of the observation
period and below 60 years at the end.
Panel A uses the standard sample while Panel B ignores exits from social assistance beneﬁt receipt that last a
maximum of two month. More speciﬁcally, spells that are interrupted by a period of non-receipt of 1-2 months
are counted as continuous, but the interjacent period of 1-2 months oﬀ beneﬁts is not counted towards the
length of the beneﬁt spell. For example, two beneﬁt spells of 4 months each that are interrupted by 2 months
of non-receipt are thus counted as a single spell of 8 months.
for the standard sample and present the results in Appendix A.3, Table A.2.
The number of beneﬁt spells per individual is inversely related to the length of individual
spells across the four countries. For Luxembourg and the Netherlands, countries with a signi-
ﬁcant proportion of long beneﬁt spells, repeat spells are infrequent. Less than one-third of all
recipients in Luxembourg have more than a single spell during the eight-year period and only
0.5% of recipients have ﬁve spells or more. In the Netherlands, 25% of recipients are observed
as having multiple spells. This number is comparable to the one presented by Snel et al. (2013),
who report that 80% of recipients in Rotterdam only have one single spell over the seven-year
observation period. In the two Nordic countries by contrast, re-entries into social assistance
are relatively frequent. More than two-thirds of beneﬁt recipients in Norway and Sweden have
multiple spells and around 30% even have ﬁve spells or more.
Especially in the Nordic countries, the number of repeat spells drops considerably if short
exits from beneﬁt receipt are ignored. Even then, however, about half of all beneﬁt recipients
have at least two spells over the eight-year period, and a sizeable minority of 11% of recipients
in Norway and 7% in Sweden have ﬁve spells or more.
These ﬁndings are robust to using an unbalanced panel for the calculations. The spell count
indeed falls when age-related sample drop-out is not accounted for, the size of this eﬀect however
is small (Appendix A.3, Table A.2).
The negative relation that I ﬁnd at the country level between beneﬁt spell lengths and the
number of spells per individual could of course be purely mechanical. As individuals in the
Netherlands and Luxembourg remain on beneﬁts for longer, they will by construction have
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Table 5: The time until re-entry
country
share of beneﬁt leavers in % who re-enter beneﬁts within
3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Luxembourg 12.0 22.3 32.0 42.0
Netherlands 9.6 16.1 23.1 32.6
Norway 46.7 60.8 70.9 77.8
Sweden 48.6 60.3 69.2 75.2
Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data for the period from January 2001 to December
2008 from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd), and Sweden (NBHW
database). The table gives the share of beneﬁt leavers who return to beneﬁt receipt within a certain time
among those who have not yet reached the end of the panel at that time.
less opportunity to return to beneﬁt receipt over a limited observation period. Gustafsson et al.
(2002), who obtain a similar result as the one presented, are hesitant to attribute much relevance
to it since their observation period of 48 months is very short.
The greater spell numbers for recipients in Norway and Sweden reported in Table 4 are
however consistent with the higher re-entry hazards for these countries presented in Figure 7.
These hazard rates account for the right-censoring of spells and thus for the fact that individuals
with very long spells may have less time remaining until the end of the observation period to
re-enter.
To quantify diﬀerences in re-entry rates across countries, I present in Table 5 information on
the share of beneﬁt leavers who return to beneﬁts. More speciﬁcally, I present the proportion
of social assistance leavers (with or without a repeat spell) who have re-entered beneﬁts within
a certain interval after leaving conditional on not yet having reached the end of the observation
period.31
In Norway and Sweden, nearly half of all beneﬁt leavers return to beneﬁts within three
months. This explains the earlier ﬁnding that ignoring short interruptions in beneﬁt receipt has
a much stronger impact on both measured spell lengths and numbers in the Nordic countries.
Only about 25% of beneﬁt leavers in these countries remain self-suﬃcient for at least the ﬁrst
two years after their exit from beneﬁts. By contrast, I ﬁnd that less than 10% of beneﬁt leavers
in the Netherlands return to beneﬁts within three months and two-thirds of those who are
observed for at least two years after leaving remain oﬀ beneﬁts during that time. The numbers
for Luxembourg ﬁnally turn out to be very similar to those calculated by Hoynes (2000) for
California, who reports re-entry rates into AFDC receipt of 23% within the ﬁrst 6 months, of
33% within 12 months, and of 41% within 24 months of leaving (page 355, Table 1).
In summary, the shorter beneﬁt spell lengths in Norway and Sweden coincide with a higher
propensity to return into beneﬁts. Moreover, a substantial share of re-entries into beneﬁts in
Sweden and Norway happen relatively quickly. Without monthly data on beneﬁt amounts, it
is diﬃcult to tell however whether these short interruptions in beneﬁt receipt in the Nordic
countries are the result of ‘administrative churning’, or whether individuals indeed gain self-
suﬃciency for short periods, for instance by ﬁnding temporary work. The number of spells per
31A recipient who leaves social assistance 10 months before the end of the observation period will thus be
included in the sample used to calculate re-entry with in 3 or 6 months (columns II and III of Table 5) but not
in the sample for re-entry within 12 or 24 months (columns IV and V).
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Table 6: The total duration of beneﬁt receipt across spells
country
duration in months share of recipients in % with a duration
median mean ≥ 6 months ≥ 12 months ≥ 24 months
Luxembourg 32 39.8 88.7 76.3 59.5
Netherlands 23 36.3 79.9 65.6 49.6
Norway 7 16.5 56.0 39.2 23.6
Sweden 10 20.7 62.3 47.5 30.8
Note: Calculations are for the period from January 2001 to December 2008 and based on monthly administrat-
ive data from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd) and Sweden (NBHW
database). The sample is limited to individuals aged at least 25 years at the beginning of the observation
period and below 60 years at the end. The total period of beneﬁt receipt is the cumulative time spent in social
assistance across all spells that are observed to start during the years 2001 - 2008.
individual is higher however in the Nordic countries even if short interruptions in beneﬁt receipt
of one or two months are ignored.
6.6 The total duration of beneﬁt receipt
The ﬁndings presented thus far indicate a much higher turnover in beneﬁt receipt in Norway
and Sweden, with beneﬁt spells being substantially shorter but repeat spells more frequent than
in the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These results can be combined to give what is referred
to as the ‘total time on welfare’ (Gottschalk & Moﬃtt, 1994) or the ‘net duration’ of beneﬁt
receipt (Leisering & Leibfried, 1999), i.e. the cumulative time individuals spend in beneﬁts over
the observation period. For better comparability across countries, I again restrict my analysis
to a balanced panel of the years 2001 to 2008. Results are presented in Table 6, with Table A.3
in Appendix A.3 providing the robustness check for an unbalanced panel.
For the majority of beneﬁt recipients in the two Nordic countries, total time spent in beneﬁts
falls well short of one year over the eight-year observation period. Median net duration on
beneﬁts is 7 months in Norway and 10 months in Sweden. The share of recipients who receive
beneﬁts for more than two years out of the eight-year period is 24% in Norway and 31% in
Sweden.
In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, recipients generally depend on beneﬁt payments for
much longer: the median time spent on beneﬁts is 32 months and 23 months, respectively. 60%
of recipients in Luxembourg and half of recipients in the Netherlands remain on beneﬁts for at
least two years. The number for the Netherlands is again slightly lower than the one calculated
by Snel et al. (2013), who report a median net beneﬁt duration of 30 months over a period of
seven years for Rotterdam.
In spite of the fact that recipients in Norway and Sweden are more likely to have multiple
beneﬁt spells, the total time spent on beneﬁts is hence considerably shorter in these countries.
6.7 Characteristics of short- and long-term recipients
To be able to speciﬁcally tailor policies at long-term recipients early in their beneﬁt spells, beneﬁt
administrations and employment services need to identify the risk factors for long-term beneﬁt
receipt. As discussed in more detail in Appendix A.1, a shortcoming of the monthly data used
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Table 7: Characteristics of recipients with short and long beneﬁt spells
Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden
share of females in %
among recipients with...
short spells 46.4 34.1 49.5 51.9
long spells 54.6 66.2 42.6 47.9
share of single parents in %
among recipients with...
short spells n/a 11.5 32.2 25.6
long spells n/a 29.9 25.9 16.9
share of over-55 year-olds in %
among recipients with...
short spells 6.5 7.8 11.1 7.0
long spells 11.9 13.9 9.3 7.6
share of immigrants in %
among recipients with...
short spells 61.6* 35.9 18.8 22.8**
long spells 52.0* 48.9 36.3 52.3**
Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data for the period from January 2001 to December
2008 from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd), and Sweden (NBHW
database). Short spells are deﬁned as those with a spell length in the bottom decile in the given country;
long spells are those with a spell length in the top decile. Recipient characteristics are measured in the ﬁrst
period of the spell. * share of recipients without Luxembourg nationality; ** proportion of recipients living in
households in which one of the adults was born abroad.
in this paper is unfortunately that the available information on the characteristics of beneﬁt
recipients is not very rich. In this subsection, I break down groups of recipients with the longest
and shortest beneﬁt spells by individual characteristics in an attempt to characterise groups
that are at greater risk of long-term beneﬁt receipt. Speciﬁcally, I consider recipients with spells
in the bottom and top decile of the distribution in the respective country, and describe them
in terms of available information on personal characteristics. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 7.
In the Netherlands and to a lesser degree in Luxembourg, women are more strongly rep-
resented among recipients who start spells with long durations. This result might be driven in
part by a large share of single parents among long-term recipients. Interestingly, the gender
pattern is reversed in Norway and Sweden, where, perhaps surprisingly, single parents are over-
represented in the ‘short spells’ group. In Norway, this ﬁnding might again be linked to the fact
that low-income single parents will typically receive Transitional Allowance rather than Social
Economic Assistance. For Sweden, I do not have a policy-related explanation for this ﬁnding.
In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, more senior individuals tend to remain on beneﬁts for
longer. In both countries, the share of over-55 year-olds is nearly twice as high among recipients
in the top decile of spell lengths compared to those in the bottom decile. If anything, the
opposite is true however in Norway, and there is no obvious relation between higher age and the
length of beneﬁt spells in Sweden.
Immigrants or individuals with a foreign nationality are represented more strongly among
recipients with long beneﬁt spells. In Norway, the share of immigrants among recipients with
spell lengths in the top decile is about twice as high than among those with spell lengths in the
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bottom decile. Similarly the share of recipients living in the household with an immigrant in
Sweden is more than twice as high among recipients with long spells than among those with
short spells. The gap for the Netherlands is smaller but still sizable. The fact that I ﬁnd the
opposite result for Luxembourg may again be driven by strong residence requirements for the
Luxembourg RMG. While these restrictions were relaxed at the beginning of the observation
period in 2001, the share of non-Luxembourg beneﬁt recipients has strongly risen over the
observation period. This implies that most non-Luxembourg recipients have been on beneﬁts
for a shorter (and more recent) time period.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied and compared the dynamics of social assistance beneﬁt receipt
in four European countries: Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The analysis
was based on monthly data from separate administrative registers for the four countries covering
periods of 9 to 23 years until the late 2000s. In the ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis, I have
examined aggregate trends in beneﬁt receipt and transition rates and related the ﬁndings derived
from monthly and annualized data. In the second part, I then followed recipients’ paths into
and out of beneﬁts in all four countries for the period from January 2001 to December 2008
to describe the distribution of beneﬁt spell lengths, the frequency of repeat spells and the time
until re-entry into beneﬁts, and the total duration of beneﬁt receipt across spells.
Beneﬁt receipt rates of working-age individuals do not follow a uniform trend in the four
countries. Receipt rates declined since the 1990s in the Netherlands and Norway, remained
stable in Sweden, and steadily increased since the late 1980s in Luxembourg. In the late 2000s,
monthly receipt rates vary between less than 2% of the working-age population in Norway to
over 4% in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Annualized data of the type used in many existing
studies of social assistance beneﬁt receipt provide a good approximation of the monthly receipt
rates only for Luxembourg and the Netherlands, where turnover in beneﬁt receipt is low. In
Norway and Sweden, short-term ﬂuctuations in beneﬁt receipt are strong, and annualized data
on beneﬁt receipt overestimate the share of the population that receives beneﬁts in any given
time by about a factor of two.
The patterns of individuals’ beneﬁt receipt are very heterogeneous across countries. In
Norway and Sweden, social assistance spells are typically very short with a median duration of
only two months and only about 5% to 10% of spells lasting 12 months or longer. The majority
of recipients however have multiple spells, and re-entry tends to occur quickly after an exit from
beneﬁts. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, by contrast, a substantial share of recipients are
long-term dependent. Around 40% of spells in the Netherlands and 60% in Luxembourg last
for at least 12 months, and 23% and 37% of spells, respectively, have a duration of 24 months
or longer. Those who leave beneﬁts are however much less likely than in the Nordic countries
to return to beneﬁts quickly, and less than one-quarter of recipients have more than one spell
over an eight-year period. The median beneﬁt duration across all spells of an individual over
the eight-year period is well below one year in Norway and Sweden, and two years or above in
the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
These results point to the fact that social assistance systems may have diﬀerent functions
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in the four countries studied. In the Norway and Sweden, social assistance appears to play
the intended role of providing short-term emergency assistance for individuals in need. In
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, by contrast, a substantial share of recipients rely on social
assistance as a means of long-term income-support. This may be problematic not only because of
the resulting high expenditures for beneﬁt payments. The strong incidence of long-term beneﬁt
receipt also implies that many recipients may have little perspective of becoming self-suﬃcient
soon, which may cause frustration and disengagement.
The reasons for the shorter spell lengths and higher entry rates in Norway and Sweden
are diﬃcult to determine based on administrative recipient data alone. Diﬀerences in beneﬁt
dynamics are likely driven by the institutional features of the beneﬁt system, for instance the
strictness of eligibility criteria, the generosity of beneﬁt levels, or the availability of active labour-
market programmes. Unfortunately, there exists little recent cross-country evidence on the
design of social assistance policies. Where social assistance is administered at the local level,
as it is the case for instance in the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, within-country policy
variation can moreover be large. Immervoll et al. (2014) provide up-to-date information on
the generosity of minimum-income beneﬁts. They show that social assistance beneﬁt levels
in Luxembourg and the Netherlands are among the highest among OECD countries reaching
typically up to around 40% of national median household income. In Norway and Sweden,
the income provided by social assistance is much lower corresponding to about 20% of median
household income.32 Recipients’ incentives to take up work might thus be lower in Luxembourg
or the Netherlands.
Also the design of the social safety-net more generally might aﬀect the dynamics of social
assistance beneﬁt receipt. As a last resort-beneﬁt, social assistance targets individuals who
do not qualify (anymore) for higher-tier unemployment insurance or assistance beneﬁts. The
design of the unemployment beneﬁt system, e.g. the maximum duration of unemployment
beneﬁt receipt or the availability of unemployment assistance programmes, will therefore have a
direct eﬀect on transitions into social assistance. The same applies for the possible availability
of alternative income-support programmes targeted at low-income individuals. In Norway, low
receipt rates and short spell lengths for Social Economic Assistance certainly reﬂect the fact
that low-income single parents typically qualify for the more attractive Transitional Allowance.
Similarly, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden all operate comprehensive disability beneﬁt
programmes, such that the number of social assistance recipients who suﬀer from problems
of physical or mental health might be lower than in Luxembourg. Unfortunately, the data
currently available do not permit accounting for the interaction of social assistance with other
beneﬁt programmes.
32These numbers are derived from the OECD tax-beneﬁt model for singles, single parents with two children or
married coupled with two children.
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Appendix
A.1 The composition of the recipient population
As a last-resort safety net, social assistance tends to support a highly heterogeneous population.
Important recipient groups are usually young adults with little work experience, those with low
education, single parents with young children, immigrants, individuals with health problems, and
other groups with limited incomes and no or little support through other beneﬁt programmes. To
the extent that these groups ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to become self-suﬃcient than less disadvantaged
individuals, the composition of the recipient population will be reﬂected in the dynamics of
beneﬁt receipt, e.g. through long beneﬁt durations.
One shortcoming of the data sets used for this analysis is that – with the exception of
the Norwegian FD-Trygd – they do not provide very rich information on individuals’ socio-
economic characteristics. While all four data sets include information on an individual’s age, sex,
and origin or nationality, only the data for the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden give reliable
information on family status, and only FD-Trygd includes educational attainment. Figures A.1-
A.3 give a breakdown of recipients into the most important client groups that can be identiﬁed
in the data and show changes in the composition of the recipient population over time. For
deﬁnitions of these variables see Table A.1 in Appendix A.2.
The share of women among recipients varies signiﬁcantly across countries (upper panel of
Figure A.1). It is lowest at around 40% in Norway, where there exists a separate minimum-
income beneﬁt (the so-called ‘Transitional Allowance’) to support single parents most of whom
are women. In the Netherlands, where the share of single parents among recipient households
is highest, close to 60% of recipients are women. In Luxembourg and Sweden, the recipient
population consists to about equal shares of women and men. In none of the four countries is
there substantial time-variation in the share of women among beneﬁt recipients.
The fraction of immigrants among recipients is high and has been rising considerably in all
countries over the observation period (bottom panel of Figure A.1). This eﬀect is most distinct
for Luxembourg, where the share of beneﬁt recipients without Luxembourg nationality more
than tripled over the observation period from below 20% of recipients in 1988 to close to 60%
at the end of 2010. Part of this rise reﬂects a general increase in the number of migrants in
the country. The FNS data unfortunately do not permit calculation of the immigrant share
in the overall population. Information from other administrative sources however suggests that
over the period from 2001 to 2009 alone, the share of working-age Luxembourg residents without
Luxembourg nationality rose from 41% to 46%.33 The more important factor however is certainly
the step-wise relaxation of residence requirements for eligibility to the RMG.34 The result that
non-natives are strongly overrepresented among beneﬁt recipients is a standard ﬁnding in the
literature on social assistance beneﬁt receipt dynamics and motivates a series of papers on the
33These numbers are based on calculations using data from the annual Social Policy Analysis File on Income
in Luxembourg (SPAFIL), see Ko¨nigs (2012).
34Eligibility for RMG was initially conditional on residence in Luxembourg for the ten years prior to the
application for beneﬁts, a requirement that was relaxed sequentially to ﬁve out of the last twenty years in 1999.
The current rules, introduced in 2001, do no longer impose a mimimum residence requirement on EU citizens;
non-refugee immigrants from outside of the EU should have lived in the country for at least ﬁve out of the last
20 years. For further information see again Ko¨nigs (2012).
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Figure A.1: Composition of the recipient population – females and immigrants
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Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database, 1988-2010), the
Netherlands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway (FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database, 2001-2009). The
reported numbers are for individuals aged 25-59 years, with social assistance beneﬁt receipt being deﬁned at
the household level. For Luxembourg, the lower panel gives the proportion of individuals without Luxembourg
nationality; for Sweden, it plots the proportion of recipients living in a household in which at least one of the
adults was born abroad.
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Figure A.2: Composition of the recipient population – singles
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Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data from the Netherlands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway
(FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database, 2001-2009). No information on family status is available
in the Luxembourg FNS data. The reported numbers are for individuals aged 25-59 years, with social assistance
beneﬁt receipt being deﬁned at the household level.
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Figure A.3: Composition of the recipient population – couples
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Note: Calculations are based on monthly administrative data from the Netherlands (SSB, 1999-2010), Norway
(FD-Trygd, 1993-2008), and Sweden (NBHW database, 2001-2009). No information on family status is available
in the Luxembourg FNS data. The reported numbers are for individuals aged 25-59 years, with social assistance
beneﬁt receipt being deﬁned at the household level.
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‘immigrant-native gap’ in beneﬁt receipt (see for instance Hansen & Lofstrom (2003, 2008) for
evidence on Sweden or Riphahn & Wunder (2012) for results on Germany).
A breakdown of recipient households by family type in Figures A.2 and A.3 shows relatively
similar patterns across countries. In Norway and Sweden, singles without children constitute by
far the largest recipient group accounting for about half of all recipient households. Singles and
couples with children each account for 20-25% of recipient households, with less than 10% of
recipient households being couples without children. In the Netherlands, the shares of recipient
households with children (singles or couples) is slightly higher at around 30%, and singles without
children constitute only around 30% of recipient households. These numbers are comparable
to those reported for a larger range of countries by Immervoll et al. (2014). Changes in the
frequency of the diﬀerent household types are modest, though there has been a steady rise in
the share of singles without children and a decline of the share of couples with children in the
Nordic countries.
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A.2 Variable Deﬁnitions
Table A.1: Variable deﬁnitions
Variable name Deﬁnition
beneﬁt receipt variables
SAt (monthly) dummy variable =1 if in month t, the individual lived in a household
in which social assistance beneﬁt receipt was recorded for any single
household member in that month, =0 if no social assistance beneﬁt
receipt was recorded for any household member; beneﬁt programmes
considered when deﬁning the beneﬁt variable are the revenue min-
imum garanti (RMG) for Luxembourg, bijstand for the Netherlands,
Social Economic Assistance for Norway and Social Assistance for
Sweden.
SAt (annualized) dummy variable =1 if in December of year t, the individual lived in
a household in which social assistance beneﬁt receipt was recorded
for any single household member at any time during the calendar
year, =0 if no social assistance beneﬁt receipt was recorded for any
household member
individual characteristics
female dummy variable =1 if the individual is female, =0 otherwise
immigrant dummy variable =1 if the individual was born abroad, =0 otherwise;
for Luxembourg and Norway: individuals without local nationality;
for Sweden: individuals living in a household in which at least one
of the adults was born abroad
age individual’s age in years
household characteristics
single, no children dummy variable =1 if the individual lives in the household of a non-
partnered adult without children as deﬁned in the data source, =0
otherwise
single, with children dummy variable =1 if the individual lives in the household of a non-
partnered adult with children as deﬁned in the data source, =0 oth-
erwise
couple, no children dummy variable =1 if the individual lives in the household of
partnered adults without children as deﬁned in the data source, =0
otherwise
couple, with children dummy variable =1 if the individual lives in the household of
partnered adults with children as deﬁned in the data source, =0
otherwise
Note: All variables except the annualized beneﬁt variable are measured once per month. The beneﬁt variable
SAt is constructed at the household level taking into account beneﬁt receipt by any member in that month
(monthly beneﬁt variable) / at any time during the calendar year (annual beneﬁt variable). ‘Individual char-
acteristics’ are deﬁned at the individual level, ‘household characteristics’ are deﬁned at the household level and
identical for all members of the household. Household-type variables were deﬁned from corresponding variables
in the original data (i.e. not by classifying households based on their observed composition and the age of their
members). No reliable household-type information is available for Luxembourg.
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A.3 Results for unbalanced panels
Table A.2: The number of beneﬁt spells per individual – unbalanced panel
# of # of spells share of individuals in %
of recipients median mean with 2 spells with 5 spells
Luxembourg 15,338 1 1.4 27.2 0.4
Netherlands 4,785 1 1.4 29.6 1.0
Norway 42,367 2 2.2 54.0 10.0
Sweden 4765,259 2 3.3 64.6 24.1
Note: Calculations are for the period from January 2001 to December 2008 and based on monthly admin-
istrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd) and Sweden
(NBHW database). The panel includes individuals who are only observed for part of the observation period.
The sample used takes account of short-term exits (compare panel A in Table 4).
Table A.3: The total duration of beneﬁt receipt across spells – unbalanced panel
country
duration in months share of recipients in % with a duration
median mean ≥ 6 months ≥ 12 months ≥ 24 months
Luxembourg 31 39.8 88.2 75.7 58.5
Netherlands 23 36.3 79.6 65.8 49.7
Norway 7 14.9 54.4 36.7 20.9
Sweden 9 19.0 60.2 44.7 27.8
Note: Calculations are for the period from January 2001 to December 2008 and based on monthly admin-
istrative data from Luxembourg (FNS database), the Netherlands (SSB), Norway (FD-Trygd) and Sweden
(NBHW database). The panel includes individuals who are only observed for part of the observation period.
The total period of beneﬁt receipt is the cumulative time spent in social assistance across all spells who are
observed to start during the years 2001 - 2008.
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